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The Place of Philosophy
Danielle Macbeth
Department of Philosophy, Haverford College
dmacbeth@haverford.edu
What is the place of philosophy in today’s intellectual culture? What should its place 
be? My intent, ultimately, is to answer this second, and more interesting, question, to 
show that philosophy should be a truly global dialogue the aim of which is to dis­
cover what I shall refer to as natural truths about us and about the world in which we 
live our lives. But in order to show the place of philosophy in this way, I need to begin 
by focusing on the place of Western philosophy, in particular analytic philosophy, in 
today’s intellectual culture. If philosophy is to emerge as a truly global dialogue in 
the intellectual culture, we need explicitly to recognize that philosophy is not and 
cannot be a science but is instead a humanistic discipline. And we will recognize this 
only if we understand both why philosophy has come to be seen, at least in most 
analytic circles, as a science, and why it cannot be one.
In the first two sections an account is sketched of why Western philosophy in 
general and analytic philosophy in particular tend toward scientism, and as a result 
have no real interest even in their own histories let alone in cross­cultural engage­
ment. The third section maps out an alternative path forward from the nineteenth 
century, one that vindicates Bernard Williams’ conception of philosophy as a human­
istic discipline aimed at understanding our distinctively human being in the world. 
Philosophy so conceived is constitutively engaged not only with its own history but 
also with philosophical traditions other than its own. It is inherently global.
I. Western Philosophy and Science: Some History
Since its first founding by the ancient Greeks, philosophy in the West has com­
bined the call for self­knowledge with a vision of a purely rational, non­sensory and 
non­perspectival, knowledge of reality as it is. Only in the seventeenth century, 
with the development of, first, Descartes’ analytic geometry (1637), and following it 
Newton’s mathematical physics (1687), did it begin to seem that the two projects 
might be essentially different. And once physics had emerged as an autonomous, 
experimental science, the idea that philosophers might discover substantive truths 
about reality through reason and reflection — as, for example, Descartes had tried 
to do — came to seem deeply problematic. How, Kant would ask, can one come to 
know anything that is at once necessary, that is, a priori, and a substantial truth about 
reality, synthetic? If the truth is substantial then one would think that an empirical 
investigation would be needed to discover it; but if an empirical investigation is 
 required then it cannot be a necessary truth that we have discovered, at least not as 
necessary, because experience can tell us only what is, never what must be. Kant’s 
 Danielle Macbeth 967
solution to the difficulty is well known: various features of our experience of reality, 
including its spatial and temporal character as well as its lawfulness, are grounded 
not in the reality cognized, as we had hitherto assumed, but instead in the cognizing 
subject. As necessary conditions of our capacity for knowledge, they are at once 
knowable a priori and real and nontrivial features of the reality that we know. Noto­
riously, this can work only if the reality known, while empirically real, is transcen­
dentally ideal.
Whether or not he did so self­consciously, Kant clearly aimed to respect the 
 interweaving of self­knowledge with knowledge of reality as it is that is the legacy of 
ancient Greek philosophy. And such an interweaving is possible for Kant, insofar as 
it is, because the self that is known is now to be conceived not, following Aristotle, 
as a kind of animal, the rational one, but instead, following Descartes, as distinc­
tively rational, as rational as contrasted with animal. As Kant thinks of it, his is 
“the genuine age of criticism,” an age that “demands that reason should take on 
anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self­knowledge [Selbsterkennt­
nis].”1 Kant ’s self­appointed task was thus to provide a critique of pure reason 
“by which reason may secure its rightful claim” and thereby to set philosophy on the 
secure path of a science.2 In short, for Kant, self­knowledge demands a critique of 
pure reason, and that critique in turn sets philosophy on the sure path of a science. 
Philosophy, like mathematics, is henceforth to concern itself with synthetic a priori 
judgments, as such judgments contrast both with analytic judgments the negations 
of which are contradictory, and with the a posteriori, synthetic judgments of the 
 empirical sciences, both natural and social, that can be known only on the basis of 
sense experience. 
Kant’s conception of Western intellectual culture was and remains today pro­
foundly influential — so much so that often its influence is simply invisible to us.3 
Nevertheless, this conception was fatally compromised when European mathemati­
cians began in the nineteenth century to eschew the practice of constructive alge­
braic problem solving characteristic of the work of, say, Euler and Gauss, in favor of 
deductive reasoning directly from concepts. Two paths forward opened up. The first 
and less radical option was to hold that although Kant had clearly been wrong to 
think that the practice of mathematics constitutively involves the construction of con­
cepts in pure intuition, he was nonetheless right about logic, right, in particular about 
the merely explicative power of deduction. The more radical option was to take 
Kant to have been wrong even about logic, to have been wrong about logic because 
he was wrong about mathematics. On this latter view, what developments in mathe­
matics in the nineteenth century show is that deductive reasoning can after all be 
ampliative, a real extension of our knowledge. This latter path was not, however, 
pursued, nor even recognized as a possibility by most practicing philosophers. It was 
the former path, the idea that Kant was wrong about mathematics but not about 
 logic, that would shape the course of philosophy in the twentieth century, at least in 
Europe and the English­speaking world. The judgments of mathematics thus came to 
be conceived not as synthetic a priori, and hence real extensions of our knowledge, 
as Kant had thought, but as analytic, merely explicative, because known by reason 
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and logic alone. And with mathematics purged of the synthetic a priori there seemed 
no good reason to recognize it in philosophy either.
Eschewing the idea of the synthetic a priori, but not the overall Kantian frame­
work, philosophers in Europe and the Americas were left with analytic judgments 
and a posteriori judgments. And given that the latter are clearly the concern of the 
empirical sciences, it came to seem that philosophy must then be, as mathematics 
had come to seem to be, a purely logical discipline — in Kant’s sense of logic now 
formalized in an adequate symbolism and extended to the full logic of relations. Thus 
was born the project of analysis of, for instance, Russell’s theory of descriptions and 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.4 In this view, philosophical problems arise because we are 
conceptually confused, bewitched by the surface grammar of our sentences. The task 
of philosophy is to analyze our claims, uncover our confusions, and bring clarity to 
our thoughts.5 Western philosophy had once again risen from the ashes, once again 
been set on the secure path of a science.
According to Kant, there is no need for mathematicians to analyze their con­
cepts. They need only to synthesize concepts out of mathematical primitives that are, 
Kant thinks, readily grasped with clarity and distinctness because they are construct­
ible in pure intuition. It is only philosophers who must deal with concepts that are 
confused and obscure.6 Already in 1817, Bolzano’s proof of the intermediate­value 
theorem — the starting points of which were provided by his analyses of the con­
cepts of continuity and convergence — showed that this is not so. Like the concepts 
with which the philosopher is concerned, centrally important concepts of mathe­
matics, at least of the mathematics of Bolzano’s day, are not at all clear and distinct. 
What mathematics needs is not the synthesis of concepts from primitives, and their 
construction in pure intuition, but instead the careful analysis and definition of 
 mathematical concepts, and deductive reasoning on the basis of the newly defined 
concepts.7 Russell’s idea that the central task of philosophy is the analysis of our 
concepts and claims is modeled on just this practice of analysis as it arose in 
nineteenth­ century mathematics. As mathematical analyses of mathematical con­
cepts enable us to replace our intuitive conceptions of mathematical notions with 
concepts that are mathematically tractable (e.g., the intuitive notion of a limit with 
Bolzano’s epsilon­delta definition), so in philosophy, Russell thinks, our intuitive 
non­mathematical notions, such as that of a denoting phrase, are to be analyzed and 
ultimately replaced, in this case by Russell’s theory of descriptions. It was thus that, 
after over two millennia of “glib assertions . . . and equally glib denials,” philosophy 
was to be finally realized as a rigorous, scientific, and fruitful mode of intellectual 
inquiry.8
II. The Place of Analytic Philosophy Today: Two Views
Early analytic philosophy, as we have just seen, was articulated within a broadly 
Kantian framework, though without the synthetic a priori. There are, on the one 
hand, issues of meaning and analyticity to be addressed by the philosopher, and in a 
different way by the mathematician, and, on the other hand, questions of empirical 
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fact, the synthetic a posteriori, to be addressed by natural and social scientists. 
 Unfortunately, as Quine famously argues in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Kant’s 
analytic/synthetic distinction cannot support a division of our intellectual labors into 
mathematics and philosophy on the one hand and the empirical sciences on the 
other.9 And it cannot because no principled line can be drawn between matters of 
meaning, intended for the philosopher (and in a different way for the mathemati­
cian), and matters of fact to be taken up by empirical scientists. There simply is no 
truth by virtue of meaning because anything we think we know, even what we (think 
we) know “by virtue of meaning alone,” can be called into question as experience 
demands and reason sees fit. Everything we think we know thus inextricably com­
bines aspects of meaning and answerability to what is. There is only a continuum of 
relative centrality in the whole web of belief. And now it seems that there really is 
nothing distinctive left for the philosopher to do. Philosophy, if it is to exist at all, 
must be “naturalized,” folded into the empirical sciences. Philosophy is continuous 
with the empirical sciences, distinctive only in occupying the more abstract and 
 theoretical end of the continuum, that is, the more centrally located portions of the 
whole web of belief.
In the Quinean view, all our intellectual inquiries are more or less empirical, 
more or less directly answerable to the tribunal of experience. Even mathematical 
work is contentful, insofar as it is only by virtue of its indispensability to the work of 
the empirical sciences.10 Still, it seems clear that mathematics has its own place in 
the culture overall in a way that philosophy, for Quine, does not — at least not now. 
And the reason, perhaps, is the fact that over the past four centuries the various nat­
ural and social sciences have, one by one, been hived off Western philosophy to 
become autonomous disciplines, each with its particular subject matter and distinc­
tive mode of inquiry. If we think of the ancient Greek discipline of philosophy as a 
kind of proto­science (alongside ancient mathematics), each daughter discipline of 
which eventually achieves sufficient autonomy and maturity to come to occupy its 
own position in the academy, then it is not at all unreasonable to think that in time 
all the contents of the proto­science that is philosophy will have been relocated, 
leaving philosophy with nothing with which to concern itself. The emergence of 
 cognitive science and neuroscience has furthermore seemed to many to show that 
that time has come. If consciousness, the last great mystery of the natural world, 
is — thanks to recent technological advances, for example, in brain imaging — now 
amenable to empirical investigation, then perhaps there really is nothing left for 
the philosopher to do. To this way of thinking, it has turned out that the sort of 
non­empirical inquiry the philosopher had engaged in had seemed viable as a 
form of intellectual inquiry only because, and so long as, we did not yet have the 
resources to engage in properly empirical investigations into the relevant phe­
nomena. Philosophy, it has turned out (to this way of thinking), was nothing more 
than an incubator for the empirical sciences. Now that all the chicks have been 
hatched, there is no role left for philosophy to play. Or if there is, that is only be­
cause there yet remain questions that the empirical sciences do not yet know how to 
answer.11
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The Quinean view is that philosophy is continuous with the empirical sciences. 
Insofar as it has any place at all in the intellectual culture, it is as a science. Bernard 
Williams defends a very different view. According to him, philosophy is a humanistic 
discipline rather than any sort of a science, as is indicated already by the place of the 
history of philosophy in its practice.
In “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline,” Williams characterizes philosophy 
as a “general attempt to make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual 
activities, in this situation in which we find ourselves.”12 And it is clear that by “our 
life” he means not our life as rational beings, whatever sort of history or culture or 
body we might also have, but instead our life as the rational animals we actually are, 
“that is to say, humans as contrasted with other possible beings.”13 Williams does not 
deny that the sciences play a central and distinctive role in the project of discover­
ing how things are “in themselves,” the project of disclosing reality as it is anyway, 
“independent of the local perspectives or idiosyncrasies of enquirers.”14 What he 
denies is that it follows that there is no independent and in its way distinctive role 
to be played by philosophy alongside the sciences. There is an important distinc­
tion to be drawn between, on the one hand, the absolute conception of the mature 
sciences — particularly, I would say, that in fundamental physics that, as purely math­
ematical, is in principle the same for all rational beings whatever their biological, 
social, and cultural forms of life — and, on the other hand, more local and perspec­
tival concepts that are rooted in “our more local practices, our culture, and our 
 history.” But it does not follow that either is intrinsically superior to the other — either 
the absolute conception (presumably because it is absolute) or the more local and 
perspectival (on the grounds, perhaps, that in actuality all our knowledge is inelucta­
bly local and perspectival).15 As Williams urges, the two sorts of concepts instead 
have very different roles to play in the intellectual culture, the former in coming to 
know how things are in themselves and the latter in our coming to understand our 
own lives, including our lives as scientists in pursuit of the absolute conception.
I do think that it should by now — after the rise of modern science, after Kant, 
after Quine — be clear that philosophy is not in the business of disclosing reality as 
it is in itself. Philosophy is not an empirical discipline as the natural and social 
 sciences are, and because it is not, it is not at all suited to the task of revealing or 
disclosing things as they are — despite the fact that originally, in ancient Greek phi­
losophy, no such distinction between philosophy and empirical science was discern­
ible. And correspondingly, because the natural and social sciences are empirical 
disciplines concerned with addressing what is as a matter of fact the case, they are 
likewise not at all suited to address questions about how and why things ought to 
be thus and so. Understanding, for example, the fact that inquiry in mathematics 
and the natural and social sciences answers to the norm of truth, and also how it is 
that such inquiry does this, are distinctively philosophical achievements that, just 
because they concern not only what is but what ought to be, cannot be achieved by 
appeal to what as a matter of empirical, that is, psychological or sociological, fact 
such enquirers do on a day­to­day basis. The task of making sense of the activity of 
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the sciences as rational, answerable to the norm of truth, is in the nature of things a 
task that only the humanistic discipline of philosophy is in a position to tackle.
One important mark of a humanistic, as contrasted with a scientific, discipline is 
the constitutive place of its history in its practice. As Williams explains, the sciences 
do not need to address their own histories because they are vindicatory: “the later 
theory, or (more generally) outlook, makes sense of itself, and of the earlier outlook, 
and of the transition from the earlier to the later, in such terms that both parties (the 
holder of the earlier outlook, and the holder of the later) have reason to recognize 
the transition as an improvement.”16 Philosophy is not vindicatory in this way in large 
part because, in philosophy, developments tend to be as much about what forms of 
argument ought to be dispositive, what ought to count as a good reason, as about 
what we in fact have good reason to hold. It is through the study of the history of 
philosophy, and only through such study, that we come to understand how certain 
forms of argument have come to prevail, without their having come to prevail as the 
result of argument. A striking example is Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. 
Given that Descartes’ aim in this work is to set aside the testimony of the senses as 
traditionally conceived, Descartes cannot provide arguments for his conclusions that 
will be rationally compelling to any and all readers. Because Descartes’ aim is radi­
cally to alter our most fundamental sense of what makes sense at all, such arguments 
as he provides cannot be rationally compelling to the Aristo telian. They are compel­
ling only to one who has already become a Cartesian. The arguments and explana­
tions of the Meditations are not vindicatory.
It may seem to follow that the findings of philosophy or our own hard­won views 
are thus without any justification or legitimacy. Williams argues that it does not. We 
are contingently formed by our history, but it is nevertheless a mistake, one that is 
akin to scientism, to think that what is needed in philosophy, if it is to have any legit­
imacy at all, is an absolute justification, one free of all the contingencies of our actu­
al historical perspective. There is, Williams argues, “no inherent conflict among three 
activities: first, the first­order activities of acting and arguing within the framework of 
our ideas; second, the philosophical activity of reflecting on those ideas at a more 
general level and trying to make better sense of them; and third, the historical activ­
ity of understanding where they came from.”17 As in any form of intellectual inquiry 
we must begin where we are, with what we think we know and understand. But in 
philosophy in particular we need also to understand how we got here if we are to be 
properly critically reflective about where we are. Analytic philosophers, for example, 
tend to think that the history of philosophy does not matter to its practice (presum­
ably because philosophy is supposed to be a science), and as a direct result, those 
analytic philosophers who think that philosophy ought to be conducted as a science 
often do so without any understanding of why they think this. In becoming “scien­
tific,” analytic philosophy has become un reflective and uncritical, and as a result is 
considerably less valuable intellectually than it might be — so much so that it is by 
now possible legitimately to question whether it has any place at all in the intellec­
tual culture.
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Williams claims that the fact that the sciences are in the business of describing 
reality as it is anyway — the same, as I would put it, for all rational beings whatever 
the contingencies of their biological and sociocultural forms of life — does not entail 
that philosophy no longer has a distinctive place in the intellectual culture. The task 
of philosophy is not continuous with that of science; it is to understand, make sense 
of, our distinctively human lives, including our lives as mathematicians, natural sci­
entists, and philosophers. “Why,” Williams asks, “should the idea that science and 
only science describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective, mean 
that there is no independent philosophical enterprise?”18 According to him, “that 
would follow only on the assumption that if there is an independent philosophical 
enterprise, its aim is to describe the world as it is in itself, independent of perspec­
tive.”19 Given that that assumption is unfounded, the move from the claim that sci­
ence describes reality as it is in itself to the claim that there is no independent 
philosophical enterprise is, Williams thinks, a non sequitur. This, however, does not 
seem to be right, and we will see that it is our own intellectual history that reveals 
why it is not right.
Williams argues that advances in the sciences are vindicatory. But often they 
can be that only in the wake of the sorts of transformations in our ways of thinking 
that are characteristic of philosophy and are not vindicatory. Without Descartes’ 
Meditations, Newton’s Principia could not be seen as vindicatory. And Descartes’ 
Meditations were in turn made possible by his advances in mathematics, in particu­
lar in analytic geometry, advances that involve, as I show in Realizing Reason, a kind 
of inversion of the order Descartes inherits from the tradition, the order that is also 
the order of our everyday lives. There are a number of aspects to this. Here we focus 
on two: the inversion in arithmetic and geometry that takes us from ancient Greek 
conceptions of number and space to modern conceptions, and the inversion in logic 
from the ancient Aristotelian idea that existence precedes essence to what Descartes 
describes as “the true logic” in which essence is prior to existence.
According to the ancient Greek conception, a number is a collection of units, 
from which it follows that zero is not a number, nor are negative and fractional num­
bers numbers. Indeed, even one is not a number, so it was argued, given that it is the 
unit out of which collections are formed and not itself a collection. Over time we 
learn not only about such numbers (even and odd, prime and composite, and so on) 
but also about the arithmetic relations that these numbers can stand in: twice three is 
six, eleven and seven is eighteen, the cube root of twenty­seven is three, and so on 
and on, until eventually one recognizes so many relations among numbers that one 
can perform a kind of figure/ground gestalt switch. The result is a conception of num­
ber as a node in a whole web of arithmetic relations. And now it seems perfectly 
intelligible that there might be negative and fractional numbers, perfectly intelligible 
that zero and one are numbers like any others. All are nodes in the web of arithmetic 
relations.
And something similar can happen with our conception of space. Although we 
begin with an experiential conception of space formed as we make our way through 
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the terrain from landmark to landmark, eventually, once we have synthesized all the 
routes we know from landmark to landmark onto one whole, we can perform  another 
figure/ground switch, understand space not as consisting in the relative locations of 
landmarks but as an antecedently given whole of possible positions at which land­
marks may, but need not, be located. The first conception of space is bottom­up and 
essentially object involving; the second, derived from and made possible through 
that first conception, is instead top­down and independent of the existence of any 
objects. As Descartes himself emphasizes, in his new form of mathematics it is not 
objects but the relations in which objects can stand that form the subject matter.
As Descartes vividly illustrates through his increasingly powerful stages of doubt 
in the first Meditation, his new mathematical practice is not dependent on the exis­
tence of any objects outside the mind — whether Forms and mathematicials as Plato 
had thought, or sensory objects considered in a particular way as Aristotle held. 
Simply by reflecting on innately known ideas of what Descartes describes as “true 
and immutable natures,” the mathematician can make discoveries. It follows directly 
that the Aristotelians were wrong to hold that existence is prior to essence, that one 
can know the essence only of what exists. Instead, Descartes came to think, “we 
must never ask about the existence of anything [never ask if it is — an est] until we first 
understand its essence [what it is — quid est].”20
Though not in the same way enacted through a figure/ground gestalt switch, here 
again we have an inversion or reversal through which the old gives way to the new. 
But if that is right then there is a profound conceptual difficulty with Williams’ idea 
that both vantage points might be viable, each in its own way. There is the way one 
thought before the inversion or figure/ground switch (the way of everyday experi­
ence), and the way one thinks after it (the way of modern science). And given the 
nature of the inversion or switch, it is senseless to suppose that one might nonethe­
less embrace both: the correctness of the one entails the incorrectness of the other. 
And this is just what we find in contemporary discussions in analytic philosophy. 
Either, with neo­Aristotelians such as John McDowell, one embraces the everyday, 
locating the practice of science within the everyday, as just one activity among 
many that people go in for, or one embraces the findings of science, demoting our 
everyday experience of things to a mere appearance caused in one by neuronal 
 activity that is itself due to impacts on one’s sense organs. One seems forced in this 
way to choose between reality as it shows up in everyday experience and reality as 
it is disclosed in the exact sciences. Given the dialectical relationship that the two 
inherit from the developments that gave birth to modern science, Williams’ attempt 
to have it both ways — both the sciences with their absolute conception of reality 
and philosophy, the concern of which is our distinctively human perspective — must 
inevitably fail.
This is not, however, the end of the story. As I show in Realizing Reason, the 
developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that transformed, first, the 
practice of mathematics (in 1637 with the publication of Descartes’ Geometry), then, 
the practice of physics (Newton’s Principia in 1687), and finally, the practice of 
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 philosophy (Kant’s first Critique in 1781/1787) were only the first wave. As already 
noted, the practice of mathematics was again fundamentally transformed over the 
course of the nineteenth century, and the practice of fundamental physics was 
 similarly revolutionized in the twentieth century. Philosophy, as already noted and 
as I argue at length in Realizing Reason, has not yet had its second revolution but 
has remained, until now, profoundly Kantian. Already by the end of the nineteenth 
century key resources needed for the second revolution in philosophy were made 
available in Frege’s work, but that work was not at all understood. Although Frege’s 
work is in fact radically post­Kantian, it was read by Russell and by twentieth­ century 
analytic philosophers following him as in effect a mere extension of Kant.
I show in Realizing Reason that a new and more adequate reading of Frege’s 
work grounds in turn a revolutionary new conception not only of the practice of 
philosophy but also of our cognitive relation to reality. (This is the second path for­
ward from the nineteenth century that is referred to above, in section I.) What recent 
developments in mathematics and fundamental physics are shown to reveal in the 
light of Frege’s work is that in fact we need both, both the everyday experience of 
reality that is enabled by our acculturation into a natural language such as Chinese 
or English and the view of reality that is enabled by the sort of purely conceptual 
mathematics that emerged in the nineteenth century together with the twentieth­ 
century advances in fundamental physics that were made possible by that new form 
of mathematical practice. We do have these two views of reality enabled by these 
two very different sorts of language, both the natural languages of our everyday lives 
and the mathematical languages we have developed over millennia and employ in 
fundamental physics. The early modern mistake, we can see in retrospect, was to 
take one language to characterize the “inner realm” of meaning and significance, 
and the other to characterize instead the “outer realm” of brute causes. In fact, as 
I argue in Realizing Reason, natural and mathematical languages provide two radi­
cally different but, each in its own way, equally efficacious and viable modes of our 
cognitive access to reality.
And now we can see, at least in principle, how there can be both philosophy, the 
concern of which is the distinctively human world, that is, reality as it is disclosed in 
our everyday lives through the medium of the natural languages we speak, and the 
sciences, the concern of which is the absolute conception of reality, reality as it is 
disclosed to any rational being, regardless of its biological and sociocultural form of 
life, through the medium of the purely rational mathematical languages we have 
developed over nearly three millennia of first Western but now truly global intellec­
tual history.
III. The Place of Philosophy
Philosophy in the West involved from the beginning what we are now in a position 
to see as two quite different projects with two very different goals, that of self­ 
knowledge and that of the knowledge of reality as it is anyway. When they were 
 Danielle Macbeth 975
distinguished with the rise of modern science, and it had become clear that Kant’s 
attempt to salvage philosophy as a science in the wake of that development had 
failed, it then seemed that we had to choose either philosophy and self­knowledge 
or science and knowledge of reality as it is in itself. (And given such a choice it 
must inevitably come to seem intellectually irresponsible to choose philosophy and 
self­knowledge over science and knowledge of reality as it is in itself.) But as I have 
suggested, we do not have to choose, and indeed must not choose. And once we 
realize this, we can see that Williams is absolutely right: philosophy is not and could 
not possibly be any sort of science. It is, just as he says, a humanistic discipline the 
aim of which is “to make the best sense of our life, and so our intellectual activities, 
in the situation in which we find ourselves.”21 The locus of philosophical inquiry is 
human life, our lives, in all their multifarious aspects and as we conceive and live 
them now. We begin, that is, where we are, with all that we think we know and 
 understand, and all that puzzles us. 
But we do not aim merely to understand all this, our lives as we conceive and 
live them now.22 Philosophy as a discipline aims to get something right. The task is 
properly or correctly to understand both what it is to be human and the nature of the 
world in which we live out our lives. And this is a uniquely philosophical task, at 
once something we can get right, or wrong, and a form of knowledge that is in its 
own way non­empirical or a priori. The aim is self­knowledge, as that is henceforth 
to be contrasted with knowledge of reality as it is in itself, the same for all rational 
beings. I want now to clarify, if only in a preliminary way, just what this means, what 
philosophy so conceived is, beginning with the idea that we have two essentially 
different modes of cognitive access to reality, that of everyday life and that mediated 
by the language of pure reason, of contemporary mathematics.
In the early modern conception of our being in the world that is superseded by 
the philosophical developments that are made possible by developments in mathe­
matics in the nineteenth century, causal impacts on our sense organs give rise to the 
appearances of things that are taken to constitute our everyday experience. The con­
ception is clearly representationalist insofar as our cognitive access to things in the 
world is taken to be constitutively mediated by these appearances. We are in direct 
cognitive contact with the appearances and only indirectly, if at all, in cognitive con­
tact with what gives rise to these appearances. According to the new conception 
made possible by nineteenth­century developments in mathematics, our cognitive 
access to things is neither merely immediate, as it is according to, say, Aristotle, nor 
ineluctably mediated by representations as in the early modern view. It is, as Hegel 
would say, at once an immediacy and essentially mediated. Although I will not try to 
develop or defend the view here, I think it can be shown that Frege’s conception 
of language in terms of the twin ideas of a sense expressed and a meaning or sig­
nification designated is just what is needed to make fully intelligible this notion of 
mediated immediacy.23 What I will do is illustrate the basic idea using a very different 
and much simpler, though I think sufficiently analogous, example: a plant taking in 
water for nourishment.
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Before any living beings emerged on the earth through the processes of biologi­
cal evolution by natural selection, there was water. Once there emerged living 
things — plants, say — water likewise emerges as something with the significance of 
being nourishing for plants. The plant emerges as an instance of some particular form 
of life, one with its characteristic powers, including the power to be nourished by 
various stuffs and characteristic patterns of behavior and growth, and correlatively 
the various bits of water come to be nourishing. As the stuff that is the matter of 
the plant is now properly described as alive, so the matter that is the water is now 
properly described as nourishing. Being nourished — of the plant by the water — is a 
form of immediacy, but it is an essentially mediated immediacy insofar as one can 
understand what is happening as a case of nourishing and being nourished only 
 relative to the particular form of life of the plant. This is evident given that an individ­
ual that is an instance of a different life form could undergo what is biochemically 
exactly the same event involving the water, but in the life of that individual the event 
could be an instance not of nourishing and being nourished but instead of poisoning 
and being poisoned. The chemical event involving the water has this rather than that 
biological significance only as mediated by the relevant life form.
As a living organism is an instance of a (biologically evolved) form of life and 
cannot be adequately understood except as such, so a rational animal is an instance 
of a (socially evolved) rational form of life and cannot be adequately understood 
except as such. In both cases the form of life provides a kind of model and stan­
dard. Consider once more the general case, that of a living organism. In order to 
understand — indeed, so much as to identify — what it is doing, or what its parts are, 
or are for, one needs to know the kind of thing it is, and how things characteristically 
are for such a kind of thing. It is only in light of such knowledge about the form of life 
that one can judge of this instance that it has, say, wings, though unfortunately they 
are so deformed in this case that the thing cannot fly as it should. So it is with a ra­
tional animal. We need to identify the language that it speaks and, more generally, 
the rational life form it is, the form of life into which it has been acculturated, and to 
know as well how things characteristically are for such a life form, for example, what 
various words and phrases mean in the (socially evolved) language that this life form 
speaks. And in this case as well, it is only in light of such judgments about the form 
of life that one can judge of particular instances, say, of the sounds that a particular 
person now utters, what words they are and what the person is saying thereby.
Both life forms and languages and cultures emerge only through extended evo­
lutionary processes (the one biological, the other social), and only in relation to them 
can we intelligibly speak of living and thinking things. As Sellars puts the point, 
“there is no thinking apart from common standards of correctness and relevance, 
which relate what I do think to what anyone ought to think. The contrast between ‘I’ 
and ‘anyone ’ is essential to rational thought.”24 “It is the linguistic community as a 
self­perpetuating whole which is the minimum unit in terms of which conceptual 
activity can be understood.”25 And as an animal’s environment, with its opportunities 
and hazards, emerges with the animal, so the world, with its perceptible objects and 
knowable aspects, emerges with a rational animal. We are in direct or immediate 
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cognitive contact with things in the world, much as the plant is directly or immedi­
ately nourished by the water, but in both cases the relationship is at the same time 
essentially mediated by the form of life involved.
As I show in Realizing Reason, the idea that we must choose between our 
 everyday understanding and experience of reality and reality as we have learned to 
conceive it in the exact sciences — one or the other, but not both — belongs to a stage 
in our intellectual growth and maturation that we are now in a position to jettison. 
Once they are adequately understood, developments in mathematics in the nine­
teenth century show that we do not need to choose between the world as it is re­
vealed in everyday experience and the world as it is revealed in fundamental physics. 
The second suggestion, more positively, is that it is our natural languages that open 
our eyes to reality as we experience and conceive it in our everyday lives, and it is 
sufficiently advanced mathematical languages, as they have emerged in the course of 
nearly three millennia of intellectual inquiry, that in their way open our eyes — more 
exactly, the eyes of the mind — to that self­same reality in fundamental physics. It is 
reality as it is made manifest through our most advanced mathematical languages 
that is the locus of absolute truth, truth that is the same for all rational beings what­
ever their bodily and sociocultural forms of life. But what, then, of reality as it is 
made manifest in everyday experience, as enabled by our natural languages? Is there 
also truth with respect to it? Or is it rather the case that everyday experience is ineluc­
tably relative to a particular language and culture? Given that, as we well know, our 
everyday experiences are profoundly shaped by our acculturation, the idea that there 
might be what we can think of as a natural truth that is the same for all human beings, 
that is, for all beings with our sort of body and form of sensibility, can seem simply 
ludicrous. Cultural relativism seems inevitable. I will suggest that it is not.
The idea of natural truth, modeled on the idea of natural goodness in ethics, is 
the idea that some truths, while not the same for (available to be grasped by) all 
 rational beings — as the truths of mathematics and fundamental physics are, at least 
in principle — are nevertheless valid for (available to) all human beings, all rational 
beings with our sort of body and form of sensibility.26 Natural truth is incompatible 
with cultural relativism. If there is natural truth, if all human beings ought to perceive 
and think about at least some aspects of the sensibly perceptible world in some one, 
true way, then cultural relativism is misplaced. As things stand, people from radically 
different cultures do perceive and think in very different ways about the perceptible 
world we live in.27 The question is: are they right to do so, or is there in fact a way 
that the humanly perceptible world, however we, or they, take it to be, is a way 
we — rational animals that we are — ought to take it? Are there natural truths?
One important reason for thinking that there must be natural truths is the fact 
that, in contrast with matters of taste, one can critically reflect on which (if either) of 
two culturally specific views of things are correct. Consider, first, a question of taste, 
the fact that, say, you like mango ice cream best while I prefer the taste of green tea 
ice cream. I can in that case understand your liking mango ice cream better than 
green tea ice cream, but I cannot experience what you experience, namely mango 
ice cream tasting better than green tea ice cream. If I could do that then I would like 
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the taste of mango ice cream better. There is no natural truth about which of the two 
tastes best; it is only a matter of taste. But one and the same person can learn to see 
a thing, say, some fish in a pond, both more (say) atomistically, as someone appropri­
ately acculturated will tend to see it, and also more holistically and relationally, as 
someone differently acculturated might. And yet the two views are incompatible; 
they cannot both be right. Or so a student of Aristotle might argue. A student of 
Nāgārjuna might suggest instead that both views are needed if we are fully to ac­
count for how things are with the fish. Significantly, both our students can learn to 
see as the other sees, and can do so without losing thereby her original perceptual 
skills. And because we can do this, so it would seem, we cannot, as we can — indeed, 
must — with matters of taste, merely leave each to his or her view of things. The ques­
tion as to the nature of fish is not a question merely about how things seem to one, 
as questions of taste are. Nor, obviously, is it merely a matter of convention how 
things are with the fish, as it is a convention which side of the road one should drive 
on or which utensil, if any, one should eat with. The question about the fish is a ques­
tion about how things are, how rational animals like us ought rationally to perceive 
and think about fish. It is a question of natural truth.
If, as I have suggested, the practice of philosophy has not been revolutionized as 
it ought to have been in the wake of the nineteenth­ and twentieth­century revolu­
tions in the practice of mathematics and physics, but remains merely Kantian, then 
one obvious task for philosophy is to articulate the new mode of inquiry in philoso­
phy that is enabled by these earlier revolutions much as Kant’s revolutionary new 
form of philosophical practice was enabled by the revolutions of the seventeenth 
century. In Realizing Reason, I take up this task (among others), suggesting that if we 
are to come adequately to understand our being in the world then what is needed in 
philosophical practice at this particular juncture is a kind of Hegelian narrative of 
our intellectual growth and maturation, the sort of narrative I provide in Realizing 
Reason. What we need to focus on here is instead the thought that if, in addition to 
the absolute truths (the same for all rational beings) that it is the aim of the sciences 
to discover, there are also natural truths, truths about the everyday human world 
that are the same for all human beings whatever the contingencies of their history, 
language, and culture, then it is a task for philosophers in particular to discover such 
truths. Indeed, I would say, the task of discovering the natural truths has always been 
a principal task of philosophy — though it is only now that we have learned to distin­
guish natural from absolute truth that we are in a position clearly to see this.
What I am calling natural truths are not empirical truths, truths such as that water 
nourishes plants or that there are black swans, truths that can be discovered only 
through an empirical investigation into things. Our question about the fish, whether 
they should be conceived atomistically or more relationally and holistically, is not an 
empirical question; although various empirical facts about fish may be relevant to an 
investigation into the question, such facts will not settle the matter. To answer our 
question about the fish requires rational reflection, critical inquiry into how, all things 
considered, it really makes sense to understand the fish — not how we most naturally, 
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given our acculturation, think of the fish, or how it is most prudent or politically 
 correct to think of the fish, but how any human being ought to understand fish. And 
there is no knowing in advance what will be relevant to one’s investigation. Perhaps, 
for example, the atomistic conception is merely an appearance to be explained by 
appeal to the sociocultural and intellectual forces that were in play already in ancient 
Greece and would eventually reach their full flowering in early modern science. 
Perhaps that is a good way to think about fish on the way to realizing modern sci­
ence, but nonetheless altogether wrong if one wants to understand the nature of 
the fish themselves. If so, one will discover this only by reflecting on the rise of 
 modern science and its roots in the distinctive intellectual culture that was ancient 
Greece.28
Philosophy, like mathematics, is not an empirical discipline. Both are, as we say, 
a priori. It is important to be clear about just what this means. First, it does not mean 
“known with infallible certainty.” To say that judgments, paradigmatically judgments 
in mathematics and philosophy, are a priori is not to say that they are infallible, or 
unrevisable in principle, or knowable merely by reflecting on what we already have 
in mind. On this point, as on many others, I think Sellars was absolutely right: noth­
ing that we know is infallible, unrevisable in principle, or indubitable; anything that 
we think that we know might after all be mistaken. Nothing is Given. And yet, it is 
clear that not all forms of rational inquiry are empirical or a posteriori. What distin­
guishes a priori forms of inquiry is not that they are somehow immune to error and 
revision but instead the fact that, in cases of a priori inquiry, one does not need to rely 
on testimony, either the testimony of one’s own senses or the testimony of others, in 
order to know. One can, at least in principle, see everything for oneself.
Think of the difference between what is required of a reader of an article in a 
scientific journal and what is required of a reader of an article in a mathematics 
 journal. The former reader is told how the experiment was performed and what the 
results were, as well as what, according to the authors, the results mean. In order to 
learn from the article in the scientific journal, a reader must rely on the testimony of 
the authors, trust that they are telling the truth, that they did what they say they did 
and that the results were as reported in the paper. Of course, one can, in the case of 
a scientific finding, aim to do something similar, to reproduce the experiment and the 
findings. But one’s own experiment is a different experiment from the original one, 
an experiment that one can likewise report but is not the very same experiment, 
 except generically, as the experiment one first read about.
In the case of a reader of a proof in mathematics the situation is very different. 
Here one can engage in the very same course of reasoning as the original author. 
One can make exactly the same moves — not merely generically, but specifically. 
One can see for oneself precisely what the original author saw — again, not some­
thing similar or analogous, but the very thing. In the case of a proof written up in an 
article in a mathematics journal, a reader does not need to rely on the testimony of 
the author, does not need to trust that the author tells the truth. In mathematics one 
can, with appropriate effort, see for oneself how the reasoning goes, why the theorem 
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in question is true. And just this is essential as well to the practice of philosophy. 
There are, in principle, no authorities in philosophy, no expert witnesses, and no 
testimonies. In philosophy, as in mathematics, one can, in principle, see everything 
for oneself — and insofar as one can, one should.
Where the practice of philosophy seems to be profoundly different from the 
 practice of mathematics is in its dialectical character, the fact that it constitutively 
involves critically reflecting on and adjudicating between a multiplicity of perspec­
tives that often any particular individual can become familiar with, but only with the 
help of others. Mathematics is not dialectical in this sense, not constitutively. Cer­
tainly it is possible in the case of mathematics that someone else might see a possi­
bility one had not seen, a case one had not considered, a jump in one’s reasoning 
that one had been oblivious to. We see this happening, for example, in the discus­
sions Lakatos rehearses in Proofs and Refutations.29 But such dialectical moments are 
not constitutive of the very practice of mathematics. The system of internal checks 
and balances that characterizes mathematical practice ensures that in principle there 
is no barrier to one’s taking into account, all on one’s own, the various aspects of an 
issue in mathematics; in the case of a mathematical problem it is always possible for 
a single person to see all the sides of a problem, to consider all the relevant cases. 
Philosophical problems are in this regard essentially different.
Although both philosophy and mathematics are a priori disciplines — disciplines 
in which one can, in principle, see for oneself what is so, rather than relying on the 
testimony of either one’s own senses or those of another knower — philosophy is 
unlike mathematics insofar as it is a humanistic discipline, a discipline concerned 
with understanding our being in the world. And that means, as we have already seen, 
that it is constitutively concerned with its past, its own history as a discipline. Given 
that so many of our ways of thinking are contingent on accidents of our history, we 
need to understand this history and these contingencies in order to achieve some 
critical distance from our own ways of thinking. Perhaps our current ways of thinking 
will survive scrutiny, but perhaps they will not. And for us so much as to begin such 
scrutiny we must know that we do not know. One way we discover this — that 
we do not know what we thought we knew, even what had seemed necessarily 
true — is by reflecting on how we got to where we are today, why we think as we 
think.
But as I have already indicated, the study of one’s own past, while necessary, is 
not sufficient precisely because it is one’s own. If we are truly to come to understand 
what it is to be human and the nature of the world in which we live and have our 
being, we need to study also the past, and current, conceptions of human beings with 
whom we do not share a culture and a past. The dialogue of philosophy, that is to say, 
must become genuinely cross­cultural, global. Because we are, each of us, instances 
of particular socially articulated forms of life — including institutional and academic 
forms of life — we come with quite contingent ways of understanding things that may 
not stand up to critically reflective scrutiny. We must come to understand other ways 
of seeing and understanding on the way to a way of seeing and understanding that 
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this is the way that, for a rational being with our sort of body and form of sensibility, 
things ought to be seen and understood. And this means that the method of philoso­
phy, unlike that of mathematics, must be dialectical, and truly global. If one  genuinely 
wants to know how things are with us, wants to make the best sense of our life, then 
one must want most of all to identify those of one’s ways of thinking that do not stand 
up to scrutiny. And the way to do that is to study ways of thinking that are different 
from one’s own, the more radically different the better. It is just as Daya Krishna says: 
“comparative philosophy has the chance to function as a mutual liberator of each 
philosophical tradition from the limitations imposed on it by its own past.”30
As we well know, things can seem to make sense when in fact they do not. And 
this is true in mathematics as much as in philosophy. One strives to make sense of 
things and in the end one thinks one has done this; one thinks that one sees clearly 
how things are. But it can always turn out that one was mistaken. Again, there is no 
certainty; our powers of knowing are fallible. But if we can get it wrong we can 
equally well get it right. Our philosophical investigations can eventuate in knowl­
edge and understanding. That our mathematical investigations can do this is due 
to the fact that we are rational beings, beings capable (fallibly) of recognizing what 
is a good reason for what — especially in mathematics, the purely rational concepts 
of which have sharp boundaries and, except for a handful of primitives, can be 
 precisely defined. That our philosophical investigations can get things right is due to 
the fact that we are human beings, rational animals of a particular sort, a particular 
biological form of life with particular frailties and a particular form of sensibility. We 
can have the self­knowledge we seek in philosophy because we are, each one of us, 
human beings. But we do not know in philosophy simply by virtue of being one of 
us, a human being, as if there were no need for study, and listening, and learning, 
together with resolute critical reflection on what one has learned, in order to deter­
mine whether, and if so how, it really makes sense. But if that is right then it is an 
especially unfortunate error of analytic philosophy to think that somehow we already 
know everything we need to know in order to do philosophy, to think that we need 
only to reflect on what we already know to make the progress we need to make. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Truly to make sense of our lives requires first 
and foremost knowing that and what we do not know, and that one has not the least 
chance of learning if one is convinced that one already knows everything one needs 
to know in order to do philosophy, that one needs only to reflect on what one already 
knows. Truly serious philosophical reflection must be not only historically informed 
but also truly global for just this reason.
IV. Conclusion
Although the requirement of self­knowledge that it is the task of philosophy to fulfill 
has in the West been intertwined from the beginning with the demand that we know 
reality as it is in itself, the same for all rational beings, it is now possible (in the wake 
of the developments in mathematics and fundamental physics over the past two 
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 centuries) to dissociate the two projects. As it is now for the first time possible to see, 
we do not have to choose, and indeed must not choose, between the absolute con­
ception of reality and that same reality as it shows up in our everyday experience. 
Philosophy and science are not one, as Quine suggests. But neither are they in any 
sort of competition. There are empirical questions, questions about the ultimate or 
absolute nature of reality that it is the task of the scientist (in particular the physicist) 
to answer. There are mathematical questions, questions about the concepts of pure 
reason the answers to which are proven a priori by mathematicians. And there are 
philosophical questions, questions about what it is to be human in the world in 
which we find ourselves. These questions are not empirical as the scientist’s ques­
tions are, and their answers cannot be proven a priori as mathematical answers are. 
And yet they can be answered.
We philosophers begin where we are, with all that we think we know and under­
stand, and all that is available to be learned. What we need to do to make progress 
is to acquire new ways of thinking and to employ precisely the sorts of rationally 
 reflective criticism and dialectical reasoning that are a hallmark of reason and the 
special purview of the philosopher on these diverse ways of thinking. We need to 
think about the different ways people in different cultures have come to understand 
reality, and we need to come to better second thoughts about how things actually are 
with us and in the world around us. We need to attend to the natural truths. This, we 
have seen, is something that the philosopher and only the philosopher is in a position 
to do. A priori and dialectical as it has always been, philosophy, now a truly global 
philosophy, not only has but can finally also know its place in today’s intellectual 
culture.
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